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Hatcher: The Power of Federal Courts to Declare Acts of Congress Unconstit

THE POWER OF FEDERAL COURTS TO DECLARE ACTS
OF CONGRESS UNCONSTITUTIONAL*
JOM H. HATCHME*
The rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States on the
NRA and the AAA have been followed by blustering challenges of
the authority of the Court to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional. This has occurred each time the Court has so ruled
since 1803. The present challengers make the same time-worn
charges as their predecessors, which are: (1) That because we derived our legal procedure from England, and the English courts
claimed no power to review Acts of Parliament, it was unprecedented for the Federal courts to review Acts of Congress;
(2) that this jurisdiction was "unknown" to the Fathers of the
American Constitution; (3) that this jurisdiction was "unintended" by the Fathers; (4) that Chief Justice John Marshall
originated the idea, and "put it over" in the case of Marbury v.
Madison' in 1803; and (5) that "There is not a line in the Federal
Constitution . .. . to authorize the assumption of such power
by the Courts; they have secured the power only by usurpation."
These charges ignore facts as well as logical sequence. Yet
they were made in the last Congress without contradiction. They
have been reiterated in occasional editorials without detailed
refutation. Since the people ordinarily believe what they read,
errors of fact on a subject so vital in our scheme of government
should not go unexposed. Therefore, let us set these charges (as
enumerated) against the historical background and the contemporary foreground of the Constitution.
First. It is quite true that English courts prior to 1787 (the
date of the National Constitutional Convention) recognized the
absolute supremacy of an Act of Parliament. That recognition,
however, was not due to a conception of legislative immunity from
judicial review, but to the fact that Parliament acted in a dual
capacity - as both legislature and court. Parliament was a court
(curia regis) before it ever assumed legislative powers; and it was
and always had been from its inception the highest court of England. An Act of Parliament was both supremely legislative and
* An address delivered before the Bar Association of the City of Charleston,
West Virginia, on January 25, 1936.
** President of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
1 Craneh 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (U. S. 1803).
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supremely judicial.2 Moreover, in the words of Viscount Bryce,
one of England's greatest writers on constitutional law, "Parliament is not a body with delegated or limited authority. The whole
fullness of popular power dwells in it. The whole nation is supposed to be present within its walls."
Magna Charta and the
other bulwarks of English liberty restrain only the kingly power.
Parliament itself is subject to no constitutional restraint. Parliament is "omnipotent." ' Congress has no judicial power (except
in relation to its own members and to impeachments) and even
its legislative powers are enumerated and limited by the Constitution. Consequently there is no ground whatever for judges to
rank an Act of Congress as they would an Act of Parliament.
The few jurists who have controverted the judicial right to
review congressional legislation have based their arguments
largely on the common law esteem of Acts of Parliament. Each
of those jurists overlooked the fundamental differences between
Parliament and Congress; each overlooked the designation of
Parliament in the Declaration of Independence as "a jurisdiction
....
unacknowledged by our laws;" each. overlooked the patent
fact that the common law is not a part of the supreme law of the
land as defined by the Constitution; and each overlooked the historical fact that the American idea of judicial review is not an
off-shoot of the common law but is a development of colonial
practice, as I shall now demonstrate.
Second. The colonial governments in America were the issue
of specific grants from the King and were thus "connected to
England through the Crown and not through Parliament or any
other governmental division of the kingdom." 4 Those grants
authorized the establishment of a limited form of self-government,
and were usually called charters, although the ones to New Hampshire, New Jersey and North Carolina were styled constitutions.
The comprehensive nature of those instruments is demonstrated
by the fact that when the colonies renounced the rule of England,
three states - Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island adopted their several charters as their state constitutions with no
change except the substitution of allegiance to the State for that
2 Pope, The Fundamental Law and the Power of the Courts (1913) 27 HARv.
L. REv. 45; HAINES, AmERICAN DOCTRINE Or JUDiciAL SUPREMACY (1914) 8

et seq.

3BaYc,

Amnumx CommoNwLrT.H (1898)

246.

4 LONG, GENESIS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
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to the King.' The colonial charters were in fact all constitutions,'
and were generalized in the Declaration of Independence as "our
constitution." The charters differed much in the specific powers
granted or denied; but they had this common provision, that local
legislation should not be contrary to the laws of England. That
provision was adapted from the Constitution of the Island of Jersey. The chronicle quaintly recites that "Jersey, Guernsey and
their fellows (Channel Islands) are simply that part of the Norman Dutchy which clave to its dukes when the rest fell away. "I
And because Jersey clave to the line of Duke William, the Norman,
after he conquered England in the eleventh century, Jersey became an English province. But it retained the right of self-government, under a constitution of its own, subject only to the power
of the English King, acting through his Privy Council or other
representative, to disapprove its local laws. That same power was
expressly asserted in some of the colonial charters, but whether
mentioned or not it was one Jersey practice which was common
to all colonies." Pursuant to that practice, the colonial laws were
constantly tested by their charters and by the laws of England.
The extent of that practice is shown by the fact that nearly four
hundred acts of colonial assemblies were annulled by the Privy
Council (or a body acting under it) because they did not pass
that test. A noted instance was in the case of Winthrop v. Lechmere,0 where the Privy Council held a Connecticut provincial Act
of nearly thirty years standing to be invalid as "contrary to the
law of the realm" and "against the tenor of their charter." The
invalidation of a colonial Act was read at least once in every
court, once in every church, and once at the military musters
fhroughout the colony.10 Thus the colonists became familiar with
that practice. The provincial laws, says Professor Dickerson in his
careful work, were constantly submitted to "a kind of constitutional test" and in this way the colonists grew accustomed "to a
limitation upon their local legislatures." He further says: "The
5 BRYCE, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 413.

6 Fowler, The Origin of the Supreme Judicial Power in the Federal Consti-

tution (1895) 25 Am. L. REV. 711, 717-8; HAINES, op. cit. supra n. 2, at 65.
7 6 LARNED, HISTORY FoR READY REFERENCE (1901) 4837.
8 RussELL, AmERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION (1915) 221; THAYER, LEGAL
ESSAYS (1908) 199-200; 5 MCMASTER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1913)

394; DICEY, CONSTITUTION (1902) 160; Fowler, A Theory of Sovereignty Under
the Federal Constitution (1887) 21 Am. L. REv. 399, 405 et seq.
9 5 Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll'ns (6th series 1728) 440.
30 2 BRUCE, INST. HIST. VA. IN THE 17TH CENTURY (1910) 507.
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parallel between British colonial practice and present day United
States practice is clear in the case of laws from chartered colonies,
as the charter was a written constitution. The local legislature
was limited by the terms of the grant (charter) ; if a power had
not been granted, it could not be exercised legally."'" How thoroughly charter-minded the colonists became is illustrated by a
decision of the judges of the Rusting's Court of Northampton
County, Virginia, shortly before the Revolution, holding that a
certain Act of Parliament was not binding on the inhabitants of
Virginia "inasmuch as they conceived said Act to be unconstitu-

tional. "12
Following the colonial period, some of the state legislatures,
Parliament-like, attempted to assume absolute powers, but such
assumptions met with general disapproval. The right of the courts
to test legislation under the State Constitutions was quickly asserted in eight of the thirteen new states." One J. H. Ralston of
Washington, D. C., has published a survey of this period which
would show that prior to 1787 judicial review of state legislation
had been sporadic and unpopular. His publication is now cited
as auth6rity by the critics of the Supreme Court. His remarks
should be accepted with caution. For example, he not only miscalled a leading Virginia decision "dicta," but further misdescribed it as follows: "In 1782, in Virginia, in the case of Commonwealth v. Caton, two judges asserted the right of the court to
resist the unconstitutional act of the legislature, and the third was
doubtful."' 4 The Virginia Court of Appeals, which decided that
case, consisted of eleven judges instead of three. One judge was
not doubtful of his right to pass on the constitutionality of the
Act in question, but was of opinion that it was unnecessary to do
so. "The rest of the judges were of opinion," in the words of the
decision itself, "that the court had power to declare any resolution or act of the legislature . . . . to be unconstitutional and
void," and they did declare the act "inoperative," because not
11 DICKERSON,

AMERICAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT

(1912) 234 et seq. Accord:

GREENE, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY (1922) 203, 239; HAINES, Op.

cit. supra n.2, ch. 3; TmYER, LEGAL EssAYs, at 3; ANDREws, COLONIAL BACKGROUND oF THE AMERAN REVOLUTION (1924) 49, 50.
12 5 MCM.AsTER, op. cit. supra n.8, at 354-5.
"M eigs, The Relation of the Judiciary to the Constitution (1885) 19 Am. L.
BEV. 175 et seq.; HAINES, op. cit. supra n. 2, ch. 5; Fowler, op. cit. supra n. 6,
at 721-2.
14 Ralston, Judicial Control over Legislatures as to Constitutional Questions
(1920) 54 Am. L. REv. 1.
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passed in manner provided by the Virginia Constitution.", The
sentiment of that perioa towards the legislative assumption of
judicial powers is well reflected in a request by the Continental Congress, made in April, 1787, to several state legislatures which had assumed the right to construe the recent
The legislatures were requested to
treaty with England.
turn over all matters affecting the treaty "to its proper department, viz., the judicial." Several state judges who had taken part
in the decisions on constitutional questions were members of the
Much newspaper publicity
Federal Constitutional Convention.
was given the decisions, particularly in Philadelphia at the time
the Convention was in session. Any question whatever as to the
information of the Convention on this subject is removed by the
notes of delegate James Madison. They show that within a few
days after a quorum of delegates had assembled, Elbridge Gerry
of Massachusetts said to the Convention: "In some states the
judges had actually set aside laws as being against the Constitution." He further added: "This was done, too, with general
So, instead of judicial power to determine the
approbation."
validity of legislation under a written constitutioh being an innovation in 1787, it had been exercised in America under colonial
and state governments successively for a hundred years prior to
the Convention.
Third. The opponents of the judicial review of legislation
say that such review could.not possibly have been intended by the
founders, because the right was refused four times at the National
Convention. The opponents refer to the rejection of a so-called
council of revision. Here are the unvarnished facts. The Virginia delegates proposed to the Convention a council on which the
judiciary should share with the chief executive the power to veto
Congressional legislation. Advocates of the council admitted
frankly that in exercising the veto power, the judges would pass
on the policy as well as the validity of laws. The same two arguments were advanced against the council each time it was presented to the Convention. One argument was that the policy of
the law was a legislative and not a judicial matter. The other
argument, as expressed by delegate Luther Martin, was that "The
will come before the judges in their
constitutionality of laws ....
official character. In this character they have a negative on the
laws." Thus the facts demonstrate, first, that. it was the veto
15 Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call 5 (Va. 1782).
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power, as such, which was denied the judiciary, and second, that
a major reason for the denial was the understanding of Martin
and his associates (the majority) that the Constitution they were
framing would confer on the judiciary the right to review Congressional legislation. Of the fifty-five delegates who attended the
Convention, only three - Bedford, Mercer and Dickinson - clearly expressed themselves against judicial review, and they did not
press their views. Their failure to do so is not specifically explained. It does appear, however, that after the Convention was
assured "that the jurisdiction given (the federal courts) was constructively limited to cases of a judiciary nature," the amendments
which phrased the jurisdiction in its final form (Article III of the
Constitution) were passed "ner. con." the classical slang of Madison for no one against.'6
Dean Trickett of the Dickinson School of Law fancied himself brilliantly sarcastic when he referred to the Supreme Court
as "pretending to have marconigrams from the. defunct men of
1787 and 1788 concerning their meaning when they adopted this or
that phrase of the Constitution. ' 7 Instead of being sarcastic,
the Dean was simply amusing. There is no need of marconigrams
from the men of 1787-8 on the meaning of Article III. They left
their construction in writing too plain to be misunderstood.
Under the title "Genuine Information," Luther Martin reported
to the legislature of his state (Maryland) in November, 1787, the
proceedings of the Convention and explained in detail the meaning of the several provisions of the Constitution. With reference
to the power vested in the Federal Courts by Article III, he wrote:
"These courts, and these only, will have a right to decide upon
the laws of the United States, and all questions arising upon their
construction . . . .Whether, therefore, any laws or regulations
of the Congress, or any acts of its President or other officers, are
contrary to, or not warranted by, the Constitution, rests only with
the judges .... to determine." In publications (The Federalist)
explaining the Constitution to the people of the State of New York,
Alexander Hamilton, also a member of the National Convention,
placed the same construction on Article III as that of Martin.
In the debates before the several State Conventions which ratified
the Constitution, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Oliver EllsIncidentally, it also appears that Dickinson later favored judical review.
Of. Trickett, Judicial Dispensation from Congressional Statutes (1907)
41 Am. L. Rsv. 65.
10

'7
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worth of Connecticut, later a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, W. R. Davie of North Carolina, and George
Mason of Virginia, all members of the National Convention, and
delegates Samuel Adams in Massachusetts, and Patrick Henry,
Edmund Pendleton, John Marshall, George Nicholas and William
Grayson, in Virginia, each construed Article III like Martin.18
The reports of the proceedings in the other State Conventions are
fragmentary or incomplete; but there is no record of a single explicit dissent to that construction in any of the Conventions.
Newspapers published in 1788-9, in every state from North
Carolina to Massachusetts, inclusive, whether friend or foe of the
Constitution, uniformly construed Article III to empower the Federal Judiciary to pass on the constitutionality of Congressional
legislation. 19 That construction was even reflected in a London
newspaper of that era in an article written by a New York correspondent.
A prominent eastern newspaper recently disparaged judicial
review not only as usurpative, but as "abhorrent to our American
system of government." No precedent for that aspersion can be
found in the records of the early sessions of Congress. The first
That Congress is accredited with
Congress met in 1789.
ninety members, of whom eighteen had been delegates to the
National Convention, and thirty-one had been delegates to the
State Conventions which had ratified the Constitution. Thus the
Constitution makers dominated that Congress. The right of judicial review was not only treated by those Congressmen as a matter of course, but was extolled by some, Elias Boudinot - the
friend and counsellor of Washington - saying that this right
"was his boast and his confidence." I could find that right questioned by only one member, James Madison, who, while doing so,
inconsistently admitted that "in the ordinary course of government, the exposition of the laws and constitution devolves upon
the judiciary." The Federal Judiciary Act passed by that Congress explicitly recognized the right of the Supreme Court on
appeal from state courts, to review Acts of Congress. That recognition has continued unto this very day and may be found in the
Had those Congressmen who recently
present Federal Code.2
is That very construction was used by some as the basis for attacking the
Constitution.
19 WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1925)
65-6; FoRD, PAMPMrS ON THE CONSTITUTION (1888); FORD, ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION (1892).

20 28 U. S. C. A. § 344.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1936

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [1936], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
spoke so contemptuously of judicial review given thoughtful consideration to the Federal Judiciary Act, they might have been
freed, in the words of Burns, from many a blunder and foolish
notion. The right of judicial review was repeatedly declared in
succeeding sessions of Congress without any concerted opposition
until 1802. Those early Congressmen were overwhelmingly in accord with the construction given to Article III by the members of
the National and the State Conventions, respectively. After reviewing with great care the utterances of the Congressmen on this
subject from 1789 to 1802, Warren in his book, Congress, the Constitution, and the Supreme Court, observes: "Hence it is an es.
pecially striking fact that Members of Congress, of both parties,
(Federalist and Anti-Federalist) should have been united in one
sentiment at least, that under the Constitution it was the Judiciary
which was finally to determine the validity of an Act of Congress. )

=

In 1802, for the first time in the history of Congress, John
Breckenridge of Kentucky, the Jeffersonian leader in the Senate,
attempted the organization of a movement to establish the exclusive right of Congress "to interpret the Constitution in what regards the law-making power."
Opponents of judicial review
quote with much unction the rhetorical denunciation thereof by
Senator Breckenridge; but they do not quote the replies to
Breckenridge or say what happened to his attempt.
Notwithstanding his prestige, he made small progress with his doctrine,
being supported only by a few associates from Virginia, Kentucky,
Georgia and North Carolina, a hopeless minority. Breckenridge
had taken before the Kentucky Legislature in 1798, the exact reverse of the position he advanced in Congress in 1802.22 His sincerity has been further impugned by some writers.23 The motives
for his attack on judicial review, however, have nothing to do with
the right of such review. That right must be determined from
the Constitution itself, irradiated by contemporary thought. The
speech of Breckenridge before the Senate presenting his position
fails in that respect. He did not attempt to analyze the language
of the Constitution, or to elucidate its meaning from the expressions of the Constitution makers, or from the sentiment of the
Constitution making period. After some declamatory questions
21 WARREN, op.
22 Id. at 215.
23 Id. at 219.

cit. supra n. 19, at 99.
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about the Constitution, he merely summarized what he called his
"idea on the subject" without giving a substantial basts for that
idea. None of his supporters were more convincing. Conceding
proper motives, the personal ideas of the Breckenridge coterie on
the science of government, unaccompanied by argument, are of little
weight on what the Constitution was intended to mean, what it
was contemporaneously construed to mean, and what its phrases
fairly defined do mean. Many of the Fathers of the Constitution
were still alive in 1802. Some were members of that Congress. It
was close enough in point of time to 1787 for the Congressmen
to be thoroughly familiar with the thoughts of the Fathers on
Article III. Those thoughts are manifested in the summary manner Congress spurned the Breckenridge doctrine. It was referred
to by Representative Henderson of North Carolina in these words:
"The monstrous and unheard of doctrine which has been lately
advanced;" and by Senator Ross of Pennsylvania in these: "By
this horrid doctrine, Congress erects itself into a complete tyranny." Democrats united with Federalists in repudiating the
Breckenridge doctrine. The stalwart Northern Democrat, Bacon
of Massachusetts, voiced the sentiments of most of his associates
when he asserted on the floor of the House that it was not only
the right of the Federal judges but it was "their indispensable
duty .... to judge for themselves on the constitutionality of every
statute on which they are called to act."
Immediately following the organization of the Federal Court
by Congress in 1789, the Federal judges commenced to assert their
right to review legislation. One of those early jurists was
Associate Justice William Patterson, who had been a member of
the National Convention. A more positive pronouncement of this
right was never made than one by him in 1795 :24 "I take it to be
a lear position; that if a legislative act oppugns a constitutional
principle, the former must give way and be rejected on the score
of repugnance. I hold it to be a position equally clear and sound,
that, in such case, it will be the duty of the Court to adhere to the
Constitution, and to declare the act null and void." It will be
remarked that this pronouncement was made six years before John
Marshall's appointment to the Suprem6 Court, which did not occur until 1801. I am mindful that Associate Justice Chase approached that construction hesitantly in 1796 ;2" but in 1800 *after
24 Vanhorne
2

v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 309, 1 L. Ed. 391 (U. S. 1795).
5 Hylton v. U. S., 3 Dall. 171, 175, 1 L. Ed. 556 (U. S. 1796).
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he had "deliberately considered the subject" (his words) he asserted the doctrine of judicial review just as strongly as had
Justice Patterson, refusing even to hear28 argument to the contrary
by Attorney General Wirt of Virginia.
It would seem that the uniform construction placed on
Article III by the delegates who phrased it, by the contemporary
publications, by the State Conventions which ratified the Constitution, by the early sessions of Congress, and by the early Federal
judges would have established that construction beyond peradventure.
Fourtht. However, in 1803, John Marshall, Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, wrote the opinion in the case of Marbury v.
Madiso, 27 which was destined to become the controversial case on
this subject. The facts in that case are of no consequence here;
it became controversial not because of its facts, but because Thomas
Jefferson took umbrage at what he termed an "obiter dissertation"
in the opinion, pronouncing the right of the court to review Acts
of Congress. The critics of the Supreme Court have placed such
emphasis on Jefferson's opposition to judicial review that some
comment thereon seems pertinent. He was fundamentally a states'
rights man. The expansion of National power under the Federal
Government had been particularly odious to him. He had atfempted to check that expansion through the celebrated Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, wherein the respective legislatures of those two states protested to the other states that certain Acts of Congress were infractions of the Constitution, and
that the states had the inherent right to say so. North Carolina,
South Carolina and 'Georgia did not either formally approve or
disapprove the Resolutions. 28 Delaware and Connecticut disapproved the Resolutions in strong terms. Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York, New Hampshire, Vermont and Pennsylvania not
only disapproved the Resolutions, but expressly stated that the
authority to declare Acts of Congress unconstitutional was vested
exclusively by the Constitution in the Federal courts. The reply
of Rhode Island to Virginia (in February, 1799) illustrates the
position taken by the six states last mentioned, to-wit: "In the
opinion of this legislature the second section of third article of
the Constitution of the United States, in these words, to-wit, 'The
20 U. S. v. Callender, 25 Fed. Cas. 239, 253, 256-7
27S upra n.1.
28 HAnqES, op. cit. supra n. 2, at 190-1.

(1800).
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judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the laws of
the United States' ests in the Federal courts exclusively, and in
the Supreme Court of the United States, ultimately, the authority
of deciding on the constitutionality of any act or law of the Congress of the United States."2 9 And mind you - this was also done
before John Marshall wrote Marbury v. Madison. The attitude
of the other states towards the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions
Upon his election as
was a keen disappointment to Jefferson.
president, shortly afterwards, he then contemplated checking federal expansion through the federal court. To that end, he planned
to make his adherent, Spencer Roane of Virginia, Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court. Jefferson was frustrated in this through the
last-minute appointment of Marshall to that office by the retiring
President Adams. It is now accepted that two bitterer political
enemies never lived within the bounds of. the Old Dominion than
Jefferson and Marshall.3" "From the day of Marshall's appointment," says Haines, "Jefferson planned for his removal and
Jefferson's partisanaimed to curb the powers of his court." '
to judicial
opposition
in
his
factor
least
a
been
at
ship must have
he had
1781,
in
written
review. For, in his Notes on Virginia,
strongly criticized the very theory of government later proposed
by his lieutenant, Breckenridge, in Congress, saying that the assumption of judicial and executive powers by the Virginia legislature was "precisely the definition of despotic government." 32
Furthermore, Jefferson was in France while the Constitutional
Convention was in session and had no part whatever in phrasing
Article III. Now who should be preferred on the construction
thereof, the Fathers or Jefferson?
That same Mr. Ralston, heretofore referred to, says that Marshall in 1796 as counsel in Ware v. HyltonP3 advocated precisely
the opposite view to that expressed in Marbury v. Madison.34
Again, I find that Mr. Ralston is in error. In Ware v. IyIfton,
Marshall was discussing a Virginia Act under the Virginia Constitution (which has no provision similar to Article III of the
Federal Constitution) and he did not even mention the powers
of the Federal Courts under the Federal Constitution.
(1836) 528 et seq.
Virginia (1907) 12 Am.HIST. REv. 776.

29 4 ELLIOTT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTiTUTION

30 Dodd, Chief Justice Marshall and

31 HAINES, op. cit. supra n. 2, at 241.

32 JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

(1787) 174.

33 3 Dall. 199, 232, 1 L. Ed. 568 (U. S. 1796).
34 Supra n.1.
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Five associate justices sat with Marshall in 1803. Three of
his associates - Patterson, Chase and Cushing - had prior thereto unequivocally declared in favor of the right of judicial review.
A fourth associate - Bushrod Washington - had been a member
of the Virginia Convention which ratified the Constitution, and
there had heard it unanimously construed to grant that right. The
statement that Marshall coerced or even influenced the Court to
concur in Marbury v. Madison is purely arbitrary. In that opinion, he merely restated the sentiment previously declared not only
by three of his associate justices and by six sovereign states, but,
in the words of Senator Beveridge, "by hundreds of men.""
The arguments in that opinion are simply repetitions of the arguments made in the Congressional debates in 1802 (particularly
those of Representatives Hemphill, Stanley, Dana and Bacon).
Instead of that opinion being the root, it was the flower of a
growth rooted in America a century before. That opinion, however, caused the embers kindled by Breckenridge .in1802 to flare
again. The animosity of the Jeffersonian group against Marshall
led its extremists either to forget or to overlook the history and
precedents supporting the right of judicial review, and (after a
few years) to characterize the opinion in Marbury v. Madison as
an original and dangerous usurpation of power. And from that
time to this, those who oppose the right of judicial review, ordinarily ignore its genealogy and continue to signalize Marbury
v. Madison in the same manner as the Jeffersonian extremists. A
recent Congressional Record quotes a Representative from West
Virginia as stigmatizing Marbury v. Madison as "the most brazen
judicial announcement ever made." According to the Record, he
attributed to justices of the peace the power, under that opinion,
to nullify Acts of Congress, and he then proceeded to "stand
aghast" and "to shudder and wonder what the outcome will be."
How unfortunate for this patriot to have suffered in that manner,
when his tremors could have been averted by even a casual acquaintance with the facts.
Fifth. When the Fathers strove so insistently to perfect a
government different from the Parliamentary government of England, and to achieve the absolute independence of the judiciary,
it is inconceivable that the Constitution produced by their care
and thought should intend for the Federal Judiciary to be bound
by the constitutional exposition of Congress - a non-judicial de35 3 BEVMaMG,

LiFE OF MARSHALTL (1919)

118.
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partment. One looks in vain in the Constitution for any reflection
of such intention. Congress, being an artificial creation of the
Constitution, can exercise only such powers as the Constitution
confers. Article I, section 1, brings Congress into being with the
fiat "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States." Mark the language: Al legislative powers are not vested in Congress, but only such powers as
are therein granted. Thus, Congressional legislative powers are
special and limited. That limitation was not casual but deliberate.
The delegates to the National Convention had hoted "a powerful
tendency in the legislature to absorb all power into its vortex"
(according to Madison), also its tendency to heed popular clamor
and selfish interests (according to Morris), and all agreed that a
check on Congress was necessary (according to Gorham). The
specific powers granted Congress are named in section 8 of Article
I and include the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the powers vested
"by this Constitution in the Government of the United States."
There is not even a hint that Congress can exercise any judicial
power (except in relation to its own members and to impeachments) such as confirming the legality of its own Acts. Section 8
fixes the absolute boundary of Congressional action in relation to
laws. Judicial exposition of laws is beyond that boundary, and
therefore beyond the range of Congress.
After conferring on Congress the right to determine its own
membership and on the Senate "the whole power to try all impeachments," the Constitution vests "the judicial power" of the
United States in the Federal courts. That phrase - "the judicial
power" - must mean all the remaining judicial power, especially
since there is no further blending whatever of judicial and legislative powers and no further delegati6n of any judicial power.
(This was expressly conceded by Madison, in the House in 1789.)
To make plain the extent of that investiture, the Article further
provides that the judicial power "shall extend to all cases in law
and equity, arising under .. . . the laws of the United States."
What is judicial power? It is the power "to declare the law."
What are the laws of the United States? They are the Constitution, the laws passed by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the United
States. 8 Thus the Constitution does have a line authorizing the
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Federal courts to declare the law in any case in law or equity
arising under the Acts of Congress. And what a comprehensive
line it is! Every case before those courts is either in law or in
equity. A line coiiferring more absolute jurisidiction in cases
which involve Acts of Congress cannot be conceived; for the power
to declare the law necessarily comprises the right of determining
what is the law and of rejecting what is not the law. Article VI
further makes those three classes of laws "the supreme law of the
land." An Act of Congress ",made in pursuance" of the Constitution, thereby becomes the lawful equal of the Constitution
itself. But an Act repugnant to the Constitution is not made in
pursuance thereof - is not "proper for carrying into execution"
the powers vested thereby in the Government of the United States
(as prescribed in Article I, section 8) - and is not the legal offspring of constitutional government. Such an Act has no place
in that trinity which constitutes the supreme law of the land. In
a case where a court must declare whether the Constitution or an
unconstitutional Act is the law, it would be the duty of the court
under the general conception of judicial duty to prefer the Constitution as paramount. The duty is made absolute by the judicial
oath prescribed by the Constitution itself, which binds the judges,
"to support this Constitution." Under that oath, they caunot,
Pilate-like, wash their hands when confronted with a patent violation of the very instrument they are sworn to support, merely
because another department of government has failed in that support. The oath to support has no exception. It permits no evasion. It requires exposition of every such violation whereon the
court is required to declare the law. And since that duty is imposed on judges by the Constitution, by amendment alone, so long
as the Constitution shall endure, can that duty be revoked.37
37 The statements of what occurred in the Federal Convention and the State
Conventions are taken for the most part from ELrior's DEBATES ON THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1836)), and FARRaND's RcoRas OF THE FEDERAL CoxVENTION (1913); and the statements of what occurred in Congress are taken
from the ANNALS oF CoNGREss, first and seventh sessions.
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